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Forward contracts are one of the main tools used by producers to manage price risk 
because forward contracts shift the risk from producers to the grain elevator offering the 
contract.  The elevators protect themselves from this risk by hedging, leaving them susceptible to 
basis risk, which they offset by adding a risk premium to the forward contracts they offer 
producers.  This risk premium is affected by increased volatility and by differences in elevator-
specific characteristics at elevator locations across Kansas. 
This study replicates the results in Taylor, Tonsor, and Dhuyvetter (2013) and adds a set 
of elevator-specific characteristics to measure their effect on risk premiums.  A random effects 
generalized least squares model is estimated due to the data gathered being panel data.  The 
contribution of this study is to further examine the drivers of risk premiums in forward contracts 
for Kansas wheat. 
The results indicate that all of the elevator-specific characteristics in the data set have a 
statistically significant impact on the value of risk premiums on forward contracts for Kansas 
wheat.  The results also confirm the findings in Mallory, Etienne, and Irwin (2012) and Taylor, 
Tonsor, and Dhuyvetter (2013) that increased volatility post 2007 caused increases in risk 
premiums.  The risk premiums after the structural break in 2007 increased by $0.069695/bushel, 
as the average risk premium prior to 2008 was $0.158682/bushel, while the average risk 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the cost that grain producers may incur by using 
forward contracting to market their wheat and manage risk.  In a historical context, forward 
contracting has been the tool of choice for price risk management by producers, as it has many 
desirable characteristics when compared to hedging futures contracts (Mallory, Etienne and 
Irwin 2012).  With a forward contract the producer is not exposed to basis risk; and has no need 
to open a margin account or manage cash flow to meet margin calls.
1
  These characteristics lead 
producers to use forward contracting to control risk; however this risk shifting mechanism does 
not come without a cost of its own.  This cost, which is essentially a basis bid that is lower than 
the expected basis at harvest or delivery, can be looked at as a risk premium that grain buyers 
offering forward contracts build into their forward contract bids to help offset the risk they are 
assuming from the producer (Hieronymus 1977).  Oftentimes the elevators will hedge forward 
contracted grain using the futures markets, which exposes them to the risks of detrimental basis 
moves and margin calls.  This transfer of risk from the producer to the elevator drives the 
elevator to charge a risk premium.  The risk premium is only one portion of the full cost of 
forward contracting, which is believed to be made up of not only the risk premium but potential 
basis forecasting error elements as well (Taylor, Dhuyvetter and Kastens 2003; Taylor, Tonsor 
and Dhuyvetter 2013; Mallory, Etienne and Irwin 2012). 
One of the main reasons that knowing the costs of these risk management tools is so 
valuable to producers is the fact that volatility of prices and basis has increased in recent years, 
which is likely to increase the costs of using forward contracts.  A visual inspection of Figures 
1.1 through 1.4, which display the average harvest time basis for Kansas elevators in Andale, 
Goodland, Garden City and Topeka, reveals that, prior to 2007 basis followed a seasonal pattern 
and was relatively stable.  The mean harvest time basis across the four locations during this 
period was -$0.2272 per bushel with a standard deviation of $0.0662 per bushel.  After 2007, 
however, basis becomes relatively more volatile, with an average basis of -$0.4110 per bushel 
and a standard deviation of $0.3086 per bushel.  The harvest time basis also appears to lose some 
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of the seasonality displayed beforehand.  If this change is permanent then it can have distinct 
implications for risk premiums and basis forecasting.  The implications are that if this change in 
volatility persists, there will be increased risk for both producers and grain elevators from 
unfavorable changes in basis and price, as well as decreased accuracy of basis forecasts by 
elevators, which could then affect the risk premiums they set for forward contracts with 
producers.  
 Two studies that have looked at basis and the cost of forward contracting before and 
after 2007, Mallory, Etienne, and Irwin (2012) and Taylor, Tonsor, and Dhuyvetter (2013), both 
found strong evidence of a structural break in basis and the cost of forward contracting in 2007.  
The structural break occurred for commodity prices and volatility as well.  This structural change 
indicates that the increase in volatility may be permanent which presents a number of challenges 
for all parties that participate in those markets.  These challenges include, but are not limited to, 
larger and more sudden changes in prices of cash grains and futures contracts, more uncertainty 
in the accuracy of basis forecasts, and more uncertainty in the size of risk premiums which will 
likely be higher than prior to 2007. 
 1.1 Thesis Objectives 
The objective of this thesis will be to replicate the results found in the study by Taylor, 
Tonsor and Dhuyvetter (2013).  After this replication, grain elevator characteristics for the 
locations used in the data set will be added in an attempt to separate the impact elevator-specific 
characteristics may have on the risk premium charged for forward contracting.  The inclusion of 
elevator specific characteristics expands the research by Taylor, Tonsor and Dhuyvetter (2013), 
as these variables were unavailable and were controlled for by estimating a component error 
structure.  By reducing the effects of spatial differences in the error term by adding elevator-
specific characteristics to the regression, it is possible to determine the direction and magnitude 
by which those effects shift risk premiums.  The overall focus of this thesis will be how the 
added elevator characteristics affect the cost of forward contracting. 
 1.2 Thesis Outline 
The remaining layout of this thesis will consist of four chapters detailing different 
sections of this study.  Chapter 2 will review past literature on the topic of forward contracting 
and risk premiums.  This review outlines a methodological foundation for the work in this study 
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as well as providing results with which to compare the findings of this study.  Chapter 3 will 
provide an overview of the data used in this thesis as well as discussing each portion 
individually.  Additionally Chapter 3 will present both the conceptual model underlying the 
study and the econometric model and methods.  Chapter 4 will tabulate and discuss the results of 
the econometric work and discuss the extent to which the results match the predictions of 
variable direction and magnitude.  Finally, Chapter 5 will draw conclusions from the results and 























Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
The literature on the cost of forward contracting is fairly extensive.  However, with the 
exception of Mallory, Etienne and Irwin (2012) and Taylor, Tonsor and Dhuyvetter (2013), the 
studies were conducted prior to 2007, when agricultural markets saw increased volatility.  This 
lack of research on forward contracting under today’s market conditions motivates an update of 
the work. 
A study conducted by Brorsen, Coombs and Anderson (1993) examined Gulf forward 
basis bids for hard red winter wheat with the intent to determine, on average, what producers pay 
for forward contracting.  The study also aimed to compare the forward contracting cost with that 
of hedging in the futures market.  The data used in the study were unpublished Gulf wheat 
forward basis bids for 1975-1991, with 1979 being excluded, as no bids were available that year.  
The bids were collected daily from January 2 through June 30.  The authors defined delivery 
time as the number of calendar days from when the bid was quoted to the last day in June.  
Overall the data set consisted of sixteen years of cross-sectional, time-series data.  For the 
empirical work, the authors used both a parametric model as well as a non-parametric method.  
The general form of the equation estimated sets the forward bids as a function of the time to 
delivery and the year.  The parametric equation they estimated is as follows: 
(1) FBBit=α0+ΣαiDi+α16DELi+εit 
where FBBit is defined as the forward basis bid in year i with t days to delivery, Di is a binary 
variable for each year of the sixteen years in the sample (1975-1991); DELi is the number of days 
to delivery, and ε is a normally distributed error term. 
 The non-parametric method used was to calculate the means of the forward basis bids for 
each day across the year and then calculate 7-day moving averages to estimate the effect of time 
to delivery.  The authors argue that this non-parametric estimation yields an unbiased and 
consistent estimate for weekly average forward basis bid; however the result for an estimate on a 
given day is neither consistent nor unbiased.  The study states that “[t]he advantage of non-
parametric regression is that an explicit functional form is not imposed” (Brorsen, Coombs and 
Anderson, 1993).  The non-parametric results show that bids offered further away from delivery 
will be lower than those offered closer to the date of delivery.  The basis increases rapidly as 
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harvest approaches, suggesting that a producer would receive, on average, a lower price by 
forward contracting as opposed to selling outright in the cash market in the last half of the year.   
 The parametric results are similar to the non-parametric analysis, confirming that as 
delivery approaches the basis bid decreases.  The parametric data also shows that over time the 
Gulf forward basis has increased.  The cost of forward contracts using the parametric approach is 
found to be half of that using the non-parametric method and the authors attribute this difference 
to the fact that the parametric equation imposes a linear form, causing this cost to be 
underestimated.   
 Another study of forward contracting costs was conducted by Townsend and Brorsen 
(2000) who examined the cost of forward contracting hard red winter wheat.  The authors state 
that the cost of forward contracting can be viewed as the expected difference in the cash price at 
harvest and the forward contract price.  They go on to argue that, if this is truly the case then 
contracting is costly when basis between the forward contract price and the futures contract price 
at delivery increases as time to delivery decreases 
 The data used in this study were gathered from a grain elevator in Catoosa, Oklahoma 
and are Arkansas River terminal elevator bids for hard red winter wheat.  The bids were gathered 
for the period 1986 through 1998 and were available for every day of the year that the elevator 
offered a forward contract bid, up to the last day delivery was accepted.  Futures prices were also 
gathered for the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBOT) July hard red winter wheat contract.  The 
authors estimate a regression of the Arkansas River terminal bids as a function of the Gulf bids 
that were collected in Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson (1993), the July KCBOT wheat futures 
prices, crop year dummy variables and the number of days left to delivery. 
 The method employed in this study includes two techniques: a parametric model and a 
non-parametric model.  The non-parametric method is a seven day moving average of the 
forward bids, similar to the method used by Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson (1993).  The 
moving average was calculated within each year and across years. 
 The parametric method involved estimation of a first differences model, which was 
obtained through a series of derived equations.  The equations state the cost of forward 
contracting, as well the fact that futures are modeled as a martingale, which culminates in the 
following equation (Townsend and Brorsen 2000): 
(2) β(t-1)-β(t) = α1+Et-1[β(0)]-Et[β(0)] 
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where β(t-1)-β(t) is the difference between the Arkansas River forward basis bid at delivery and 
at t-1 days to delivery.  On the right hand side of equation (2), the term Et-1[β(0)] has an expected 
value of Et[β(0)], which means that the whole term Et-1[β(0)]-Et[β(0)] has zero mean and can be 
viewed as an error term.  This leaves the right hand side of the equation as only α1, suggesting 
that the process of forward contracting has a unit root. 
 The results of the non-parametric estimation suggest that the cost of forward contracting 
trends upward as days to delivery decrease, and that under the assumption of unbiased futures 
prices, forward contracting near planting would result in a lower price than a producer selling 
cash grain at harvest.  The authors conclude that the costs associated with forward contracting 
are higher than those of hedging with futures. 
 Another study dealing with the question of hedging cost versus forward contracting cost 
of wheat was conducted by Taylor, Dhuyvetter and Kastens (2003).  The purpose of the study 
was to examine two risk management tools available to producers (hedging via futures and 
forward contracting), and determine the cost differences between them.  The authors use forward 
contract bids collected from 48 Kansas elevator locations on a weekly basis.  The bids start in 
week 10 of the calendar year and end in week 21.  Week 27 was selected as the harvest week for 
basis calculation purposes.  The other price that was collected was the July KCBOT hard red 
winter wheat contract price.  The expected basis was calculated as the new crop bid minus the 
July futures contract price and the actual basis was calculated as the cash price at harvest minus 
the July futures contract price.  The authors state that the difference between expected basis and 
the actual basis can be viewed as the cost of forward contracting, which is also referred to as the 
risk premium.  The results of the study show that the average cost of forward contracting across 
locations was $0.09/bushel.  The authors also found that forward contracting costs declined as 
harvest approached and attributed this finding to the basis risk declining as harvest approaches.  
This study also shows that this cost would be less if the commission cost of hedging is included. 
 The authors also discuss some issues with the study and its results.  These issues are that 
predictions of basis at harvest, either historical or that predicted by the new crop bid calculations, 
have not been very accurate over time.  It has also been shown by this study that elevator 
predictions of harvest time basis have not necessarily been any more accurate than historic 
averages.  The data also show that the risk premium may not always be a positive value, as some 
years show a negative value, which would mean that producers actually received money for 
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forward contracting as opposed to paying a fee.  On average however, the cost of forward 
contracting is still a positive value. 
 A study undertaken by Mallory, Etienne and Irwin (2012) aimed at quantifying the cost 
of forward contracting for corn and soybeans in Illinois.  The study also examined the possibility 
of a structural break occurring after 2007. 
 The data set consisted of daily pre-harvest forward contract bids from 1977-2010 and 
uses calendar year weeks 20-29 for corn and 6-29 for soybeans.  The forward basis bids were 
from seven different regions across Illinois and represent one bid per region per week.  For the 
futures price component, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) December contract was used for 
corn and the November contract for soybeans.  The resulting data set is a panel of 238 location-
year pairs. 
 The conceptual model that the authors specify follows Townsend and Brorsen (2000) and 
specifies the cost of forward contracting as the difference in the spot price at delivery and the 
current forward price.  The forward basis is defined as the difference between the forward bid 
and the futures price, and a cash basis at maturity is defined as well.  The authors then solve for 
an equation that is the expectation of the difference in forward basis at time t before harvest 
minus basis at harvest and the futures price at time t before harvest minus futures price at 
maturity.  Since the futures price is modeled as a martingale the second term drops out to garner 
an equation that is the difference between the expected basis prior to harvest and actual basis at 
harvest.   
 The other major goal of the article was to determine if a structural break had occurred 
before and after 2007.  The authors used Welches two sample t-test with unequal variances, 
which were statistically significant.  This significance led the authors to present the results for 
each subsample (1977-2006, 2007-2010) as well as pooled across years.  The study found the 
cost of forward contracting for corn to be $0.95/bushel and statistically significant and the cost 
appears to be stationary through the marketing year. 
 The results for soybeans show the lagged coefficient on cost of forward contracting is 
again $0.95/bushel and statistically significant.  The authors again hesitate to conclude that they 
found an actual downward trend.  Again the results in percentage terms for soybeans are much 
like the results in levels 
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 The authors conclude that there has indeed been a structural break in the cost of forward 
contracting for corn and soybeans in Illinois as the costs post 2006 are much higher than those 
before 2006.  The authors also conclude that the post 2006 world has more weekly variability, 
which could play a role in making forward contracting more costly than hedging.  This 
uncertainty leads to forward contracts no longer being the outright cheapest way to manage risk, 
so producers must be very careful and diligent in their decision making process over what tool 
will be most effective in helping them manage their risk exposure element. 
 The last article reviewed here is the most recent article on this topic and was performed 
by Taylor, Tonsor and Dhuyvetter (2013).  The study’s objective was to determine if the cost of 
forward contracting faced by grain producers has been affected by an increase in volatility of 
wheat basis in Kansas. 
 The data used in this study were forward bids collected from 18 locations across the state, 
cash price at harvest, prices for the KCBOT July wheat futures contract, and implied volatilities 
for the KCBOT July wheat contract.  The model used in the study was derived from a series of 
equations that culminates in an equation that defines the cost of forward contracting to be a 
function of the difference in the elevators expected basis and the implicit basis they set in the 
forward contract plus an additive risk premium. 
 The empirical model that the authors use is a fixed effects model that aims at estimating 
the risk premium that elevators build into their forward contract bids.  The equation is as follows 
(4) ri,j,t = β1 + β2BVi,j-1 + β3Ri,j-1+ β4IVj,t + β5SB + Σ
T
t=1 βtWt + μi + εi,j,t 
where β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, BVi,j-1 is a measure of the implicit volatility of 
the previous year’s forward contracts, Ri,j-1 is a variable for the returns on previous year’s 
forward contracts,  IVj,t is the implied volatility of the July wheat futures contract, SB is a binary 
structural break variable, and Wt are a set of binary variables representing each week of the crop 
year in which forward contracts were offered. 
 The results of the study find that the risk premium varies across elevator locations in a 
systematic manner, and that increases in volatility of basis and futures prices have increased the 
cost of forward contacting for producers.  The results also suggest that returns to forward 
contracting in previous years affect the risk premium and that a structural break in the cost of 
forward contracting occurred after 2007, likely due to the increase of volatility of basis. 
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This thesis will contribute to the existing literature on forward contracting and risk 
premiums by examining the effects of elevator specific variables on risk premiums.  The need for 
more current studies is clear as only two (Mallory, Etienne, and Irwin 2012; Taylor, Tonsor, and 
Dhuyvetter 2012) examine these topics after the basis and price volatility shift in 2007.  The 
existing literature is comprised of differing evidence on how risk premiums and the cost of 
forward contracting move as harvest approaches, which means that more examination of how 
forward contracting costs change over time is necessary.  However some overarching statements 
can be made about the findings in the existing literature.  The first is that the costs of forward 
contracting decline as harvest approaches and the second is that the cost of forward contracting 
has increased in recent years.  The other area where this thesis will contribute to the literature is 
in the consideration of elevator-specific characteristics variables and their impacts on forward 









Chapter 3 - Data and Methodology 
  3.1 Data Overview 
The data set compiled for this thesis consists of wheat forward contract bids, futures 
prices, and cash prices at harvest time, as well as implied volatility for the July KCBOT wheat 
contract and several elevator-specific characteristics, which will be outlined later in this chapter.  
To give a better visual representation of the data contained in this study, three figures are 
presented.  All three figures present data for the Andale, Kansas location, which was selected due 
to its consistent availability of the information summarized in the figures.  Figure 3.1 shows the 
forward price over the time, Figure 3.2 shows the implied, or expected, basis over time, and 
Figure 3.3 shows the changes in the risk premium measure over time.  This chapter will 
separately discuss the price data, elevator characteristic data, and location choices. 
 3.1.1 Price Data 
The forward and cash prices were collected from DTN on a weekly basis from locations 
throughout Kansas (DTN.com).  The forward bids are gathered every Wednesday, or Thursday if 
the Wednesday bid was unavailable or was a holiday.  The data contained some unreported 
values, which were subsequently filled in form an alternative data source (Bloomberg).
2
    
The futures prices are from the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBOT) July hard red 
winter wheat contract
3
.  The futures contract used for the implicit basis at time t of forward 
contracting is the July contract prices for time t, while the futures for the basis at harvest is the 
average price of the July contract during the fourth week of June.  The cash price at harvest was 
also gathered and is the price that each elevator location offered on the Wednesday of the fourth 
week of June.  The implied volatilities are an average of puts and calls for the July contract at 
time t. 
This dataset also contains three variables that were calculated from the values discussed 
above: an expected basis, an actual basis, and a calculated risk premium.  The expected basis at 
                                                 
2
 The missing values were week 16 in 2001, weeks 10-16 in 2007, weeks 20-22 in 2008, weeks 15-22 in 2009, week 
5 in 2010, week 15 in 2011 and week 18 in 2012. 
3
 These contracts were moved to the CME Group in April 2012 but for this study the KCBOT prices are used. 
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time t before harvest is taken as the difference in the forward bid price and the July futures price, 
basis_fc(t) = bid_fc(t) – July_fc(t).  The actual basis, or realized basis at harvest, is taken as the 
difference in the harvest cash price and the June week 4 July futures contract price, basis_h(0) = 
cash_h(0) – July_h(0).  Finally the forward contract risk premium variable is taken as the 
difference in the actual basis and the expected basis variables, prem_fc = basis_h(0) – 
basis_fc(t). 
 3.1.2 Elevator Characteristics 
 The elevator characteristics used in this study were gathered from the Kansas Grain and 
Feed Association directory books for each year of the dataset (2001-2012).  Each elevator 
submits information specific to their facility regarding capacity, rail access, feed mill operation, 
and licensing.  A set of six characteristics were identified and summary statistics, along with a 
brief description of each characteristic, are shown in Table 3-1.  These characteristics were 
chosen because they are relevant to the research question.   
 Most of these variables are binary with the exception of vertical storage capacity and flat 
storage capacity.  Capacity measures the changes in vertical storage over time while flat_cap 
marks the changes in the horizontal storage, also called flat storage capacity.   
 For the binary variables a 1 represents yes and 0 represents no; these responses 
correspond to whether or not the elevator has the characteristic in question.  The first two binary 
variables are state_gwh and fed_gwh, which represent state licensed grain warehouse and federal 
licensed grain warehouse, respectively.  In this data set the two are mutually exclusive, meaning 
that no elevator is both state and federally licensed.  State_gwh equals one if the elevator is a 
state licensed grain warehouse, and zero otherwise.  Likewise, fed_gwh equals one if the elevator 
is a federally licensed grain warehouse, and equal to zero otherwise.   
 The variable feed_mill indicates if that the elevator has a feed mill on site in addition to 
its grain storage facilities.  The variable equals one if the elevator has an on-site feed mill, and 
zero if it does not have this amenity on the same premises.   
 The next variable, rail, identifies if an elevator is located next to a railroad.  It should be 
noted that elevators have two options when transporting grain: rail and truck.   Rail equals one if 
the location has access to a rail head, and zero otherwise.   
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 The last variable, terminal, examines whether or not the elevator location is a terminal 
elevator.  A terminal elevator takes in grain from country elevators or producers, inspects grain 
for quality and quantity, stores it and has the ability to transfer the grain to foreign or domestic 
buyers via rail, truck or ship.  Terminal equals one if the location is a terminal location, and 
equals zero otherwise. 
 3.1.3 Location Data 
The 18 locations, shown in figure 3.4, that were chosen for this study were chosen based 
upon two major criteria: diversity of their physical location across the state and their consistency 
of available forward contract bids (Taylor, Tonsor, and Dhuyvetter 2013).  Geographic diversity 
of the locations considered in the study is important in order to achieve a representative sample 










Figure 3.2 - Implied Basis Over Time 
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Table 3-1, Elevator 
Characteristics Summary  
  
Elevator Characteristics  Variable Names Description Mean Std Min Max 
Total Capacity tot_cap Total vertical and horizontal storage capacity 1428.364 772.5357 258 4214 
Total Capacity Squared tot_cap2 Squared total vertical and horizontal storage capacity 2636762 2694389 66564 1.78E+07 
Fed Lic. Grain Warehouse fed_gwh Indicates if elevator is federally licensed 0.4592255 0.4984482 0 1 
Feed Mill feed_mill Indicates if elevator has feed mill on site 0.2915718 0.4545897 0 1 
Rail rail Indicates if elevator has access to rail transport on site 0.6952164 0.4604206 0 1 




Table 3-2, Cross Tabulation Table 
 
when 
fed_gwh = 0 
when 
fed_gwh = 1 
when 
feed_mill = 0 
when 





Average Capacity 1298.082 1581.781 1304.176 1730.102 998.7025 1616.727 
Proportion of Rail 
Access 54.08 45.92 70.84 29.16     
Proportion of Fed. 




























3.2 Conceptual Model 
This section describes the theory underlying the econometric model that is estimated.  
Also discussed is the economic intuition for the use of elevator characteristics in the empirical 
model. 
 3.2.1 Conceptual Model 
 
Following Taylor, Tonsor and Dhuyvetter (2013), the cost incurred by farmers who use 
forward contracts, Cfci,j(t), is defined as follows: 
(5) Cfci,j = Cpi.j(0) – Fci.j(t) 
where Cpi,j(0) is the cash price at harvest for wheat in crop year j, offered by elevator i.  Fci,j(t) is 
the forward contract bid offered by elevator i for wheat in crop year j at time t to harvest.  As has 
been in other studies, the forward contract bids that elevators offer have a risk premium built into 
them, so equation (5) can be rewritten as: 
(5.1) Cfci,j = Cpi.j(0) – (Fci.j(ri,j))(t) 
where all element definitions remain the same as in equation (4) with the risk premium on the 
forward contract bid offered by elevator i in crop year j defined as ri,j.  With the specification of 
equation (5.1), and since it is not possible to actually observe the risk premium, a calculated 
value for the forward contracting cost after harvest is used.  This observation of the actual 
harvest time basis can be compared to the expected, or implicit, basis at the time of the forward 
contract bid. 
 Also following Taylor, Tonsor, and Dhuyvetter (2013), the terms in equation (5) can be 
rewritten and shown broken down into their component parts.  The terms in equation (5.1) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
(6) Cpi,j(0) = Bi,j(0) + Kpj(0) 
(7) (Fci,j(ri,j))(t) = Bi,j(ri,j)(t) + Kpj(t) 
where Bi,j(0) is the harvest time basis in crop year j for elevator i; Kpj(0) is the KCBOT July hard 
red winter wheat contract price at the time of harvest for elevator i in crop year t; Bi,j(ri,j)(t) is the 
basis at the time of the forward contract, which can also be viewed as the implicit basis within 
the forward contract, by elevator i in crop year j at time t before harvest; and Kpj(t) is the 
KCBOT hard red winter wheat July contract value in crop year j at time t before harvest. 
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Now that the components of equation (5.1) have been defined they can be substituted 
back into (5.1): 
(8) Cfci,j = Bi,j(0) + Kpj(0) – Bi,j(ri,j)(t) – Kpj(t) 
With equation (8) defined as above, the need now arises to apply expectations operators 
to show that some elements in the equation are values that producers expect to be a certain way 
at harvest.  The expectations operators, whose expectations are conditional on information that is 
set at time t before harvest in crop year j, will be applied to the first two right-hand side terms in 
equation (8), Bi,j(0) and Kpj(0).   The expectations operators are applied to the harvest time basis 
term because at the time the forward contract is offered the elevator uses an expectation of what 
the harvest time basis will be to estimate basis and inform their decision of where to set the 
forward contract price.  This this value is a representation of what participants in the industry 
believe price will be at contract maturity, harvest time in the case of this study.  Applying the 
expectations operators’ yields: 
(8.1) Cfci,j = Ej(t)[Bi,j(0)] + Ej(t)[Kpj(0)] – Bi,j(ri,j)(t) – Kpj(t) 
where expectations are again conditional on information at time t, in crop year j.  The futures 
prices used are modeled as martingale prices, which means that the expectation of harvest time 
price at t before harvest is equal to the actual harvest time price.  This explanation is best shown 
mathematically such that, Ej(t)[Kpj(0)] = Kpj(t).  Clearly the second and last right-hand side 
terms will now drop out of the equation.  Therefore equation (8.1) can be rewritten as: 
(8.2) Cfci,j = Ej(t)[Bi,j(0)] – Bi,j(ri,j)(t) 
In looking at the last term in equation (8.2), Bi,j(ri,j)(t), it is clear that the implied basis, or 
basis at the time of forward contracting, and the risk premium are both a part of this term and as 
in Taylor, Tonsor and Dhuyvetter (2013) it is assumed that the risk premium is an additive 
component on the forward contract price bid.  Therefore equation (8.2) becomes 
(9) Cfci,j = Ej(t)[Bi,j(0)] – Bi,j(t) – ri,j(t) 
where Ej(t)[Bi,j(0)] is the elevators expected value of the basis at harvest, set at time t before 
harvest, which is also the basis they use in setting the forward contact bid price.  Bi,j(t) is the 
actual realized basis at harvest and ri,j(t) is the risk premium on the forward contract when it is 
set at time t before harvest.  The first two terms make up one part of the cost of forward 
contracting because if the elevator is accurate in forecasting the harvest time basis the difference 
in these two terms will be zero and the only cost of forward contracting will be the risk premium 
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portion.  If, however, the elevators do not correctly predict the harvest time basis the difference 
in the first two terms will either be positive or negative and the cost of forward contracting will 
not only be the risk premium but also the difference in expected and actual basis.  If this 
difference is positive, the expected basis is larger than the actual basis, the elevator will lose 
money as they have effectively paid the producer to engage in a forward contract.  If the 
difference is the opposite, a negative value, meaning the expected basis was less than the actual 
basis, the elevator will make more money than it had intended and the producer will have paid 
even more for the opportunity to forward contract wheat.  The risk premium as defined here can 
also be thought of as the elevators cost of doing business with forward contracts.  The elevator 
uses the risk premium to offset the risk it incurs by taking on the producers risk, as well as using 
it to offset some of the costs of hedging, such as maintaining a margin account.  The error in 
basis forecasting, or lack thereof, could be systematic, which could provide insight as to how 
error in forecasting affects the cost of forward contracting.  If a systematic trend in forecasting 
error could be observed it may be able to be linked to possible similar trends in risk premiums, 
which could then indicate more definitively how each portion affects the cost of forward 
contracting.   At this time in this study, however, even though the data set contains both the 
implied basis and the actual at harvest basis, the risk premium component is not observed 
explicitly so it is impossible to determine to what extent each item affects the cost of forward 
contracting measure. 
 3.2.2 Elevator Characteristics 
The first independent variable in the model is ave_ivt and it measures the average implied 
volatility of the wheat futures contract at time t before harvest.  This variable only has a time 
component because each elevator location in the sample faces the same volatility on the July 
KCBOT wheat futures contract.  The reason this variable is included in the model is to measure 
the implied volatility of puts and calls for the July wheat futures contract, which reflects the 
volatility of the wheat futures contract used for hedging by both producers and elevators.  High 
volatility makes predicting the harvest time price, and the direction of price moves, much more 
difficult.  This uncertainty about the stability of futures prices would more than likely drive 
producers to use alternate methods of risk management and elevators to protect themselves from 
unfavorable futures moves in other ways as well.  One of the ways in which an elevator could 
26 
 
help to insulate itself from this volatility would be to build in a larger risk premium to their 
offered forward contract bid price, a contract which they would then hedge.  The expected sign 
on the ave_ivt variable is positive, meaning that when the volatility increase the risk premium 
will increase correspondingly. 
The next variable is std_fcb1i,t,j-1 which measures the standard deviation of the previous 
year’s forward contract bid prices, and gives an observation of how elevators changed their bids.  
This observation is put into a contemporaneous model because it is not possible to observe the 
changes in forward bids until after harvest.  This variable has both time and location components 
because it varies over time and across the elevator locations.  The importance of having this 
variable in the model is that it measures the variance of the forward contact bids, which could 
indicate several things.  The first is, the variance of forward bids may indicate weak stability in 
either wheat cash prices or futures prices.  The connection to cash prices is that the forward bids 
the elevators offer are based on the elevators expected price at harvest and the cash price at the 
time before harvest when the forward bid is offered.  Excessive volatility in cash price would 
lead to forward bids showing large variation as well.  The connection with futures prices is that if 
futures are highly volatile elevators may find it harder to protect themselves by using them and 
will reflect this uncertainty in their basis bids.  This lack of stability would naturally bring about 
uncertainty on the part of the elevators, which would make them keen to protect themselves from 
damaging price moves by using higher risk premiums.   
The explanatory variable return1i,t,j-1 measures the returns on the previous year’s forward 
contracts for the elevator locations, whether they be positive, negative or zero.  The variable has 
both time and space components as it can vary over time at each elevator and across the elevator 
locations.  The importance of having this variable in the model is that the returns to forward 
contracts the elevators experience can influence their aversion to risk, or the amount of risk an 
elevator is willing to expose itself to, which in turn influences the amount of risk protection the 
elevator will use.  The returns the elevators make, and the risk protection they use, are affected 
by the increase in volatility, uncertainty and their ability to accurately predict the basis at harvest.  
The accuracy of these predictions is an issue because the elevator attempts to predict the basis at 
harvest via the forward bid price and the futures contract price and if they do not correctly 
predict this basis they may set their forward bids at the wrong level.  This causes problems for 
the elevator at harvest because if they set a forward bid price that is higher than the expected and 
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realized price, the basis becomes positive, which means the elevator loses money on the forward 
contracts and the producers make money on the contract.  It is possible the risk premiums are 
affected by the amount of risk protection an elevator desires.  If the returns to last year’s forward 
contracts were positive for the elevators, they may be able to offer a more competitive forward 
bid by lowering the risk premium.  The opposite side of this positive scenario would be if the 
previous year’s forward contracting returns were negative, the elevator may increase its risk 
premium in order to protect itself from more risk and make back some of the profit they lost in 
the previous year.  The predicted sign for the return1it variable is negative. 
The two variables, weekt and week_sqt are included to account for a potential non-linear 
effect of time remaining to harvest on the forward contract risk premium.  If there is a quadratic 
effect form time remaining to harvest, the derivative with respect to weekt shows both the 
direction and rate at which the risk premiums decrease or increase as harvest time approaches.  
The expected sign on the week trend variable is negative because as harvest approaches the 
uncertainty about the season’s crop decreases (Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson 1993; Taylor, 
Dhuyvetter, and Kastens 2003).   Thus the elevators would have less need to cushion their 
downside risk, and be able to offer forward bids with lower risk premiums.  
The next two variables in the model are tot_capit and tot_cap2it which are the total 
capacity and total capacity squared.  The total capacity variables are created by taking the sum of 
the flat capacity and vertical capacity for each location.  These capacity measures can vary over 
time giving these variables both time and location components.  The importance of having these 
variables in the model is that they allow for a potential non-linear effect of elevator capacity on 
risk premiums that are built into forward contract bids.  The tot_capit variable gives the direction 
in which risk premiums move as total capacity of the elevator locations changes and the 
tot_cap2it variable measures the rate at which capacity affects the risk premium.  The full effect 
of the two variables is calculated by taking the derivatives of each and summing them together.  
This allows for a view of the direction of change in risk premiums via the coefficient on the total 
capacity variable and the nature of this change, whether it is at an increasing rate or a decreasing 
rate.   
The expected sign on the total capacity variable is negative because as the grain storage 
capacity of the elevator increases the cost of forward contracting and the risk premium 
component should decrease.  Conversely as capacity decreases it should increase the cost and 
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risk premium.  This is because as the elevators ability to store grain increases so too does its 
ability to absorb the impacts of potential and realized contract defaults by producers who do not 
have the grain to fulfill their contract obligations.  This ability to absorb these defaults lessens 
the need for the elevator to insulate itself using high risk premium values.  The decrease of this 
overall cost to forward contracting makes this a more appealing option to producers, in turn 
bringing more grain and business to the elevator. 
The next variable, fed_gwhi, is the first of several binary variables indicating if an 
elevator has certain characteristics.  The variable fed_gwhi indicates whether or not the elevator 
is a federally licensed grain warehouse.  The opposite of this is for the elevator to be a state 
licensed grain warehouse, and the two are mutually exclusive in this data set, which means that 
all of our elevator locations are either federally licensed or state licensed.  This elevator 
characteristic only varies over the location component in the model as time does not affect it for 
the time period of this study.  The fed_gwhi variable is included because all grain warehouses 
must be licensed at either the state or federal level.  With that being the said, any impact the type 
of licensing would have on the risk premium would be due to some difference between the 
requirements of the two license types.   
A state licensed grain warehouse may act as a true grain warehouse in that it can purchase 
or hold grain pursuant to state code but may not hold federally loaned grain without a federal 
Uniform Grain and Rice Storage Agreement (UGRSA) (Kansas Department of Agriculture, 
2011; Illinois Department of Agriculture; SD Public Utilities Commission, Warehouse Division; 
USDA: FSA Uniform Grain and Rice Agreement, 2013).  A federally licensed grain warehouse 
on the other hand has all of the benefits of a state licensed warehouse but it can also use and store 
grain that is loaned by the federal government, again pursuant to federal code or the Uniform 
Grain and Rice Agreement (SD Public Utilities Division, Warehouse Division; USDA: FSA 
Uniform Grain and Rice Agreement 2013).  The benefit of having the ability to use and store 
government grain is one item sets the two licensing categories apart, as this ability allows the 
elevator to get a loan of federal grain if they are short of grain that they need for shipping or 
milling.   
The other two aspects that make the licensing types different are inspection frequency 
and net worth requirements.  State licensed warehouses are mandated to be inspected yearly, 
while federally licensed warehouses are to be inspected every three years (Casper 2013).  In 
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terms of net worth, state elevators must have a net worth of $0.25 for every bushel of capacity, 
with a minimum of $25,000 or $50,000 for elevators seeking a UGRSA.  A UGRSA may be 
obtained through the USDA for no charge and allows the facility to store federally loaned grain 
(SD Public Utilities Division, Warehouse Division).  Federally licensed elevators must have a 
net worth of $0.25/bushel for every bushel of capacity with a minimum of $200,000 (Casper 
2013; SD Public Utilities Division, Warehouse Division; USDA: FSA Uniform Grain and Rice 
Storage Agreement 2013).  The higher net worth requirement for federal licenses might make the 
elevator more financially stable and affect their pricing strategies for forward contracts.  It may 
be that this financial stability carries over into more competitive bids or causes the elevator to be 
more conservative and charge a higher risk premium.  Therefore, the expected sign on this 
variable is ambiguous.   
The next binary variable is feed_milli.  This variable indicates whether or not the elevator 
has a feed mill on site.  The reason this variable is included in the model is to account for the 
potential impact an on-site feed mill may have in diversifying the elevators business.  The sign 
on this variable is expected to be negative, which means that it will decrease the cost of forward 
contracting and risk premiums.  The reason is that with a feed mill on site the elevator eliminates 
the cost of transporting grain to a feed mill and it has the ability to mill the grain into feed stuffs, 
which are higher value products, for sale to animal feeders across the state.  Both of these 
benefits reduce risk for the elevator, which could lead to lower risk premiums. 
The variable raili, indicates whether or not the elevator location has access to rail 
transport.  This variable varies across the elevator locations, but not across time in the sample.  
The importance of this variable is that access to rail diversifies transportation options for grain 
elevators and allows them to ship their grain by rail or transport it by truck to its final 
destination.  This variable is expected to have a negative impact on the risk premiums of forward 
contracts. 
The last variable in the regression is terminali, which indicates whether or not the 
elevator is a terminal elevator.  This variable varies only across the elevator locations, not across 
time.  This variable is included because terminal elevators are often large capacity operations 
that take grain from all over and then store it to be transported by rail, truck, barge or other 
means to destinations both foreign and domestic.  An elevator being a terminal location could 
have impacts on its risk premium level because their large capacity would drive their risk 
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premium down due to the fact that more capacity creates a risk cushion.  This could also affect 
risk premiums due to the other factors discussed with the tot_capit variable.   
 3.3 Econometric Models 
 Two models are estimated in order to determine the variables that drive changes in risk 
premiums of forward contracts.  Table 3.3 shows summary statistics of the variables used in both 
models.  The first model that was estimated is as follows: 
 
(10) ri,j(t) = α + β1 ave_ivt + β2 std_fcb1i,t,j-1 + β3 return1i,t.j-1 + β4 weekt + β5 week_sqt + 
                   β6   tot_capit + β7 tot_cap2it + β8 fed_gwhi + β9 feed_milli + β10 raili +   
                    β11 terminali + εit 
where α is a constant; ave_ivt is the average implied volatility for the July wheat futures contract 
at time t to harvest; std_fcb1i,t,j-1 is the standard deviation of the forward contract bids for 
elevator i at time t to harvest; return1i,t,j-1 is a backward looking variable for the elevator i’s 
return on the previous year’s forward contracts, at time t before harvest; weekt is a weekly trend 
variable and week_sqt is the squared counterpart used in conjunction with the week trend in order 
to capture the possibility of a quadratic effect of time on risk premiums.  The following variables 
are the selected elevator characteristics from the locations across Kansas, with tot_capit being a 
variable for total capacity of elevator i at time t to harvest and tot_cap2it being the squared 
version of the total capacity variable that shows the full effect of capacity; fed_gwhi is a binary 
variable indicating if the elevator is a federal grain warehouse or a state licensed grain 
warehouse; feed_milli is a binary variable that indicates if the elevator location has a feed mill on 
site or not; raili is a binary variable that indicates whether or not the elevator has access to rail 
transport; terminali is a binary variable that indicates where or not the elevator is a terminal 
elevator.  εit is an iid error term.   
 The second model that was estimated is similar to the first but is estimated under a 
different specification with a different error structure, and is as follows 
(11) ri,j(t) = α + β1 ave_ivt + β2 std_fcb1it + β3 return1it + β4 weekt + β5 week_sqt + 
                   β6   tot_capit + β7 tot_cap2it + β8 fed_gwhi + β9 feed_milli + β10 raili + 
        β11 terminali + μi + εit 
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where μi + εit is an error structure with μi being an elevator-specific error term, and as such it 
does not change over time but only over the elevator locations, and εit is an error term that is 
independent and identically distributed (iid).   
 Equation (10) is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, while equation 
(11) is estimated using random effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression.  The benefits 
to the random effects GLS model are that it allows one to view how risk premiums are affected 
by both time and location components, which also makes full use of the panel aspect of the data 
in this study.  For panel data models, random effects GLS is preferred to OLS because OLS is 
inefficient due to the location-specific term having correlated errors for the same location.  This 
error correlation produces OLS results that are inefficient with incorrect standard errors.  
However random effects GLS utilizes the location and time attributes of the panel data and a 
component error structure to produce efficient results (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; McManus, 










 Variable Names Description Mean Std Min Max 
Forward Contract 
Risk Premium prem_fc 
Risk premium on forward contracts for Kansas 
wheat 0.1884235 0.2849615 -0.505 1.421 
Average Implied 
Volatility ave_iv 
Average implied volatilities for July wheat futures 
contract 31.16047 7.749675 18.11 54.845 
Standard Deviation of 
Forward Contract 
Bids std_fcb1 
Standard deviation of the previous year's forward 
contract bids 0.0647938 0.072335 0.001118 0.6313614 
Return on Forward 
Contracts return1 Return on previous year's forward contracts 0.1490522 0.2392879 
-
0.3033333 0.9425714 
Week  week Week of the crop year 14.44233 5.835947 1 25 
Week Squared week_sq Week of the crop year squared 242.6248 169.9286 1 625 
Total Capacity tot_cap Total vertical and horizontal storage capacity 1428.364 772.5357 258 4214 
Total Capacity 
Squared tot_cap2 
Squared total vertical and horizontal storage 
capacity 2636762 2694389 66564 1.78E+07 
Fed Lic. Grain 
Warehouse fed_gwh Indicates if elevator is federally licensed 0.4592255 0.4984482 0 1 
Feed Mill feed_mill Indicates if elevator has feed mill on site 0.2915718 0.4545897 0 1 
Rail rail 
Indicates if elevator has access to rail transport on 





Chapter 4 - Results 
In this chapter results for both models, the OLS and random effects GLS, are presented.  
Results for the regressions without the elevator characteristics are supplied in Appendix A.  The 
OLS results are shown in table A-1 while the RE GLS results are shown in table A-2.  
Comparing the results for the estimations with and without the elevator characteristics gives an 
idea of how adding the characteristics affects the fit of the model.  An inspection of the 
respective R-squared, and Adjusted R-Squared, measures indicates that both the OLS and RE 
GLS models show gains from adding the elevator characteristics.   The results of the OLS 
regression are shown in table 4-1, while the results for the random effects GLS regression are 
shown in table 4-2.  The coefficient estimates from the two models are very similar, and the fit of 
the model as measured by the R-squared values are also similar.  The lack of difference between 
the two models is likely a result of the panel information being picked up by the elevator-specific 
characteristics that were added to the model specification.  This may have caused the random 
effects GLS estimation technique to not differ noticeably from the OLS estimation.  The 
coefficient results for the more robust of the two models, the random effects GLS model (R-
squared 0.4801), will be discussed here.   
Two of the variables in the model described in equation (10), terminali and tot_capit, are 
correlated at a 0.6855 level.  This high level of correlation can cause the coefficient estimates to 
be biased.  The high level of correlation between the two variables also nullifies an assumption 
of the OLS and random effects GLS estimation methods.  Both methods require all linear 
regressors to be independent of one another in order to be best linear unbiased estimators 
(BLUE).  The high level of correlation requires one of the variables from the regression to be 
dropped.  The variable that will be dropped is the terminali variable.  The reason this variable 
was chosen to be dropped from the model is that only a small portion of the eighteen locations 
used in this study are terminal elevators. 
The sign of the coefficient for the variable ave_ivt is positive, which matches the expected 
sign for the variable.  This variable is statistically significant at the one percent level (p<0.01) 
with a p-value of 0.000 and suggests that as the volatility on the July wheat futures contract 
increases by $0.01/bushel the risk premium an elevator charges does as well, by $0.004/bushel. 
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The variable std_fcb1it has a positive coefficient that is statistically significant (p-value 
0.000), which indicates that as the variation of the previous year’s forward bid prices increases 
so does the risk premium on bid prices in the current year.  This can be viewed as a reflection of 
the uncertainty in predicting the harvest time basis by elevators.  Due to this year to year 
uncertainty elevators appear to attempt to protect themselves by using a higher risk premium 
which clearly increases the cost of forward contracting for wheat producers. 
The next variable, return1it is statistically significant and has a negative sign on its 
coefficient, which matches the expectation of a negative relationship.  The coefficient estimate 
for this variable indicates that as the elevators return on last year’s forward contracts increases, 
the risk premium on the forward bids offered in the following year will decrease.  The opposite 
scenario would be if the returns on last year’s forward contracts are negative, the risk premium 
on the next year’s bids will increase.  This is likely due to the elevator looking to recoup some of 
its losses from the previous year by charging a higher risk premium the following year.  For 
every $0.01/bushel increase in returns on previous years forward contracting, the risk premium 
decreases by $0.52/bushel. 
The next two coefficients in the model are weekt and week_sqt and are used in conjunction 
in order to examine the direction and rate of change in risk premiums as harvest approaches.  The 
sign of the coefficient for weekt is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level (p-
value 0.000) and the sign for week_sqt is negative and significant at the same level (p-value 
0.000).  These two coefficients indicate that as harvest approaches the risk premiums increase at 
a decreasing rate.  Figure 4.1 shows this effect graphically. 
This finding goes against the expected effect of risk premiums decreasing as harvest 
approaches.  However an examination of figure 4.1 shows that the effect of time causes the risk 
premium to increase in the weeks farthest out from harvest.  This impact occurs at a decreasing 
rate until week 15 of the calendar year, where it then switches and becomes negative.   
An explanation for this coefficient finding could lie in the findings of several previous 
studies, as the results on time to harvest and its effects on forward contracting differ slightly 
across them.  The two most recent studies have used a similar time frame as this study and are 
therefore the best to compare to the finding here.  Taylor, Tonsor and Dhuyvetter (2013) find that 
their time tend variable is consistent with previous research in that it shows that the cost of 
forward contracting decreases as time to harvest decreases.  However when viewed in pre- and 
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post-2007 structural break periods, the evidence is less robust, as the pre break period has a time 
trend that is significant, and the post break period has one that is not.  They conclude that this 
lack of a significant trend after 2007 could be due to the variability in basis driving risk 
premiums more so than time or local information gathered over time.  Mallory, Etienne and 
Irwin (2012) found that the time trend they used showed no significant evidence of a downward 
slope over the full time period or in either of the two structural break periods.  This evidence 
points to the fact that time may be an ambiguous indicator of risk premium movements, 
especially through only limited lengths of time. 
The variable tot_capit is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level (p-
value 0.000) and the variable tot_cap2it is positive and statistically significant at the one percent 
level (p-value 0.000).  This indicates that as total storage capacity of an elevator increases, the 
risk premiums will decrease at an increasing rate.  This result matches the predicted sign and 
even gives a look at the expected rate of the decrease, which is the derivative of the coefficient 
estimate on the tot_cap2it variable.  Figure 4.2 shows this total effect graphically.  The effect 
decreases at an increasing rate for capacities up to 1,642,600 bushels, where it then switches and 
becomes positive.  This effect shows that the tot_capit variable conforms to prediction that as 
elevator size increases the risk premium decreases, but only up to a certain point.  This could be 
due to several different factors, including, but not limited to, market power, forecasting ability, 
capacity utilization, and production expectations. 
Market power could influence an elevators risk premium through the ability of the 
elevator to set its’ own price instead of offering a price that is equal to fair market value.  This 
kind of power is usually seen in larger firms, which could correlate to why the effect of the total 
capacity variable is as seen in Figure 4.2.  If the larger firms in this study have market power 
they could use that power to set their forward contract price artificially high, via a larger risk 
premium, which would explain the effect the tot_capit has on the risk premium measure. 
The forecasting ability of elevators is another factor that could impact how capacity 
affects risk premiums on forward contracts.  If the elevator is poor at forecasting harvest time 
price or basis levels they may set their forward bid price such that they under or over utilize their 
grain storage capacity.  This could cause the elevator to change its forward bid basis or risk 
premium in the next year, giving the impression that capacity was what caused the change as 
opposed to forecasting basis. 
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As was mention above, utilization of elevator capacity, as well as the elevators need for 
grain, could have an impact on forward contracting.  The utilization of an elevators capacity in 
two ways, depending if their capacity is being under or over utilized.  If an elevator is at full 
capacity they may increase their risk premium, thereby decreasing the forward contract bid and 
decreasing the likelihood of producers bringing in grain due to the lower price they would 
receive.  On the other hand if an elevator wants to attract more grain, they may lower their risk 
premium in order to give a more favorable price to producers, who would then be more likely to 
bring grain to the elevator. 
An elevators need for grain could also impact the effect of the tot_capit variable, 
especially for smaller elevators.  A smaller elevator may need to be more aggressive to get grain, 
whereas a larger elevator may not need to use this tactic.  The aggressiveness of the small 
elevator would come in the form of decreased risk premiums, which would make the forward bid 
price more attractive to producers who are looking to contract their grain. 
Production expectations are another item that could explain the effect that total capacity 
was found to have on risk premiums in this study.  If production is expected to be full then an 
elevator may offer weaker basis bids due to the fact that more crop production will drive prices 
down.  On the other hand, if production is expected to be low, an elevator may offer strong basis 
bids in order to attract grain to the elevator. 
The variable fed_gwhi is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level (p-
value 0.000), which goes against the expected sign for this variable.  The sign on this variable 
indicates that if an elevator is licensed federally as opposed to being licensed by the state of 
Kansas they will increase the risk premium built into the forward contract.  The reasons for the 
finding could be due to the difference in state licenses and federal licenses.  For Kansas grain 
warehouses the two major differences in the license type are inspection frequency and net worth 
requirements.  State licensed warehouses are required to be inspected yearly, while federally 
licensed warehouses are only required to go through inspection every three years.  The lower 
federal inspection frequency may be attractive to elevators that lack efficient management and 
are thus lax when it comes to keeping up with regulations and guidelines.  The way that net 
worth requirements differ between the license types could explain the difference between the 
expected and actual sign on this variable as well.  For state licensed grain warehouse the 
operation must have and be able to maintain a $25,000 net worth or 50% of the value of the 
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stored grain (South Dakota Public Utilities Commission Warehouse Division).   The federal side 
of things is a bit different with federally licensed grain warehouses needing to have and maintain 
a net worth of $200,000 or $0.25/bushel on every bushel for their total capacity (USDA FSA, 
2011).  The net worth differences could mean that most federally licensed warehouses are larger 
than some of their state licensed counter parts, which can be seen in table 3-2.  This plays into 
the risk premium measure through capacity, as was stated earlier. 
The variable feed_milli is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level (p-
value 0.000), meaning that if the elevator location has a feed mill on site their risk premium on 
forward contracts will increase by $0.095/bushel.  This coefficient does not match the predicted 
sign as feed_milli was expected to have a negative impact on the risk premium measure.  Some 
reasons for this disparity could be the grain mix an elevator desires to keep in storage, the 
location of the elevator or the fact that feedlots often have feed mills of their own.   
If the elevator wishes to keep more corn or other commodities in storage rather than 
wheat they could possibly increase the risk premium on their wheat contract offers in order to 
limit the volume of wheat producers will contract with the elevator. 
The location of the elevator could also come into play with the commodity mix that the 
elevator wishes to have in their bins.  If the elevator is located in the area of the state that is 
highly saturated with feedlots they may well desire to keep more corn on hand for sale to cattle 
feedlots.  The elevators in the sample are fairly evenly distributed throughout the state however 
so the effects of feedlot concentration or grain growing regions may not be the biggest factor in 
giving this variable a positive sign. 
Following on the location of elevators, another reason this variable could have come out 
differently than expected is that many feedlots have their own feed mills on site and thus may not 
need to purchase pre-milled grain.  If an elevator made an investment for a feed mill that it ended 
up not utilizing or utilizing at an inefficient capacity it could stand to reason that they would try 
and gain back some of the losses from that investment by increasing the risk premium on its 
forward contracts. 
The last variable in the regression, raili, has a negative coefficient that is statistically 
significant at the one percent level (p-value 0.000).  This suggests that if the elevator has on-site 
rail access, they tend to decrease their risk premiums on forward contracts by $0.063/bushel.  
The sign on the estimated variable matches the prediction of a negative relationship between raili 
38 
 
and the risk premium measure due to lower transportation costs being passed on to producers 
through lower risk premiums. 
 4.2 Further Variable Examination 
Two variables were added to the models represented in equation (10) and equation (11) to 
investigate their impacts on forward contract risk premiums.  The variable aiv_futt replaces the 
original implied volatility measure and sbt is a binary structural break variable.  The results for 
the OLS regression with these added variables are shown in table 4-3 and the results for the RE 
GLS regression with the added variables are shown in table 4-4. 
The aiv_futt variable is an interaction variable between the average implied volatility and 
futures price.  This variable only has the time component as all elevators face the same volatility 
in prices.  It is included in an attempt to capture price level variability as well as to examine if 
the basis level is correlated with the price level.  The expected sign on this variable is positive 
because as the variability in price increases, the risk premium should increase as well.  This is 
due to the fact that, much like with implied volatility, as variability increases, so too does 
uncertainty and elevators will try to minimize the negative impacts of this uncertainty with 
higher risk premiums. 
The results show that aiv_futt is positive and statistically significant at the one percent 
level (p-value 0.000), which matches the expected sign for this variable.  The coefficient on this 
variable indicates that as price level variability increases by $0.01 elevators will increase their 
risk premium by $0.0003/bushel. 
The variable sbt is a binary variable indicating a structural break in wheat prices before 
and after 2007.  This variable only varies across the time component because every elevator 
would face the effects of the structural break in wheat basis volatility  A 1 for this variable 
indicates the year was after 2007, whereas a 0 indicates the year was 2007 or earlier.  The 
expected sign on this variable is positive because increased variability due to the structural break 
in prices and volatility will cause elevators to increase risk premiums in order to reduce their risk 
from wild and unfavorable swings in price. 
The results show that sbt is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level 
(p-value 0.000), which matches the expected sign for this variable.  The coefficient on the 
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structural beak variable indicates that after 2007, forward contract risk premiums increased by 
$0.07/bushel. 
With the effects of all the above variables taken into account it can be seen that the 
average risk premium on Kansas wheat forward contracts increases by $0.069695/bushel.  The 
average risk premium before the structural break in 2007 was $0.158682/bushel, while the 




Table 4-1, OLS Regression 
     
prem_fc Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
ave_iv 0.0037097 0.0007296 5.08 0.000 0.0022789 0.0051405 
std_fcb1 2.495766 0.0752438 33.17 0.000 2.348199  2.643333 
return1 -0.5134688 0.0227962 -22.52 0.000 -0.5581764 -0.4687612 
week 0.0176548 0.004302 4.1 0.000 0.0092179 0.0260917 
week_sq -0.0005753 0.0001468 -3.92 0.000 -0.0008632 -0.0002873 
tot_cap -0.0002595 0.0000242 -10.74 0.000 -0.0003068 -0.0002121 
tot_cap2 7.93E-09 6.34E-09 12.52 0.000 6.69E-08 9.17E-08 
fed_gwh 0.0455284 0.0117808 3.86 0.000 0.0224241 0.0686327 
feed_mill 0.0979601 0.0124555 7.86 0.000 0.0735326 0.1223875 
rail -0.0569833 0.0136108 -4.19 0.000 -0.0836766 -0.0302901 
_cons 0.0288209 0.0382058 0.75  0.451 -0.0461077 0.1037494 
R-squared 0.471 
Adj. R-






Table 4-2, RE GLS Regression 
prem_fc        Coef.    Std. Err. z     P>z      [95% Conf. Interval] 
ave_iv    0.0036886 0.0007266 5.08 0.000 0.0022645 0.0051128 
std_fcb1     2.503866 0.0749164 33.42 0.000 2.357033 2.6507 
return1   -0.5232276 0.0226542 -23.1 0.000 -0.5676291 -0.4788261 
week   0.0176666 0.0042618 4.15 0.000 0.0093135 0.0260196 
week_sq   -0.0005729 0.0001454 -3.94 0.000 -0.0008579 -0.0002879 
tot_cap    -0.0002609 0.0000288 -9.06 0.000 -0.0003174 -0.0002045 
tot_cap2    8.29E-08 7.18E-09 11.55 0.000 6.88E-08 9.69E-08 
fed_gwh     0.0524502 0.0150221 3.49 0.000 0.0230074 0.0818929 
feed_mill     0.0945428 0.0164717 5.74 0.000 0.0622588 0.1268268 
rail     -0.061519 0.0174893 -3.52 0.000 -0.0957973 -0.0272407 
_cons     0.0232484 0.0395325 0.59 0.556 -0.0542339 0.1007306 






Table 4-3, OLS Regression With Additional Variables 
prem_fc Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
aiv_fut 0.002882 0.0000632 4.56 0.000 0.0001643 0.0004121 
std_fcb1 2.201972 0.0798068 27.59 0.000 2.045456 2.358488 
return1 -0.5019916 0.0245589 -20.44 0.000 -0.5501561 -0.453827 
week 0.0191326 0.004112 4.65 0.000 0.0110682 0.0271969 
week_sq -0.0006116 0.0001405 -4.35 0.000 -0.0008872 -0.0003361 
tot_cap -0.0002343 0.0000236 -9.94 0.000 -0.0002805 -0.000188 
tot_cap2 7.00E-08 6.21E-09 11.28 0.000 5.78E-08 8.22E-08 
fed_gwh 0.0461103 0.0114227 4.04 0.000 0.0237083 0.0685123 
feed_mill 0.0973581 0.0121119 8.04 0.000 0.0736045 0.1211118 
rail -0.0470584 0.0132491 -3.55 0.000 -0.0730422 -0.0210746 
sb 0.0680925 0.0176414 3.86 0.000 0.0334945 0.1026906 
_cons 0.0438693 0.0329651 1.33 0.183 -0.0207812 0.1085198 




Table 4-4, RE GLS Regression With Additional Variables 
prem_fc        Coef.    Std. Err. z     P>z      [95% Conf. Interval] 
aiv_fut 0.0002849 0.0000626 4.55 0.000 0.0001621 0.0004077 
std_fcb1     2.206335 0.0794864 27.76 0.000 2.05045 2.362126 
return1   -0.5123667 0.0244026 -21.00 0.000 -0.560195 -0.4645384 
week   0.0190506 0.0040708 4.68 0.000 0.0110721 0.0270292 
week_sq   -0.0006066 0.0001391 -4.36 0.000 -0.0008792 -0.000334 
tot_cap    -0.0002405 0.0000278 -8.64 0.000 -0.000295 -0.000186 
tot_cap2    7.41E-08 6.97E-09 10.63 0.000 6.05E-08 8.78E-08 
fed_gwh     0.0519982 0.0144164 3.61 0.000 0.0237426 0.0802538 
feed_mill     0.096354 0.015823 6.09 0.000 0.0653416 0.1273664 
rail     -0.0479294 0.0168378 -2.85 0.000 -0.0809309 -0.014928 
sb 0.0696954 0.017535 3.97 0.000 0.0353274 0.1040634 
_cons     0.040845 0.0344243 1.19 0.235 -0.0266253 0.1083153 
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Figure 4.2- Risk Premium Across Total Capacity and Total Capacity Squared 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 Most of the elevator-specific characteristics that were examined in this thesis were found 
to have a statistically significant impact on risk premiums of forward contracts.  The impact of 
different elevator characteristics could be of assistance to producers in their decision of which 
risk management strategy to use and their decision of which elevator to take their grain to, if they 
have a choice in available elevator locations.  These impacts could also assist elevators in their 
decisions to change some of their elevator characteristics, based on how they affect forward 
contacting.  If an elevator desires to use forward contracts to a greater or lesser extent, it may be 
affected by the characteristics of the elevator.  The conclusions of Taylor, Tonsor, and 
Dhuyvetter (2013), that increased volatility in expected and actual basis has increased the 
forward contacting cost to producers, were supported by the results of the study.    
 Some limitations of this study include determining all the unobservable factors that the 
elevator characteristics measured in the model, the fact that the forward contract bids are offers, 
not accepted bids, and the choice of estimation method.  The question of the elevator 
characteristics representing something other than what they define arises because some of them 
came out with signs that were not expected and were statistically significant.  This could mean 
that the elevator characteristics are reflecting some of the unobserved impacts on risk premiums 
such as management traits, business structure and practices, and finances.  These traits are often 
not easily measured explicitly so it may be that they are being captured by the elevator 
characteristics. 
 The forward contract bids being offered bids by the elevator rather than actual accepted 
contracting prices limits this study because it does not allow for insight on producers ideas of 
price.  If accepted bids were available they could show if there were a cutoff price that producers 
are willing to accept for forward contracts.  They could also be used, along with grain production 
numbers, to examine trends in the forward prices, such as if forward bid prices are low and not 
being accepted, if could mean that the elevator is not in need of grain. 
 The issue of model estimation methods refers to the justification of choosing the random 
effects GLS regression over the OLS regression.  If an improvement of the efficiency of the 
coefficient estimates was achieved for the data used in this study by employing random effects 
GLS, the regression would have yielded smaller standard errors than the OLS regression.  This is 
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the case for many of the variables in the regression, but not all of them.  Also, the improvement 
in the efficiency was very small, even for the variables with improved efficiency of the standard 
errors.  An explanation for this is that the panel effects of the data were captured explicitly 
through the elevator characteristics so the additional benefits of random effects GLS are 
minimal. 
 Future research on this topic may include further investigation of the unobservable 
aspects of the data on elevator-specific characteristics, especially how some of the characteristics 
are related or measure similar aspects of the elevator industry.  Examining different econometric 
specifications could yield significant results if a specification was found that fit the data more 
closely or that showed a different side of the data and results found in this thesis.  Other research 
could look at using more locations or other grains, such as corn and soybeans, to see if the results 
of this study hold for them as well.  Another avenue to examine would be how producer demand 
for forward contracts affects the risk premiums on the contracts, as this study focuses on the 
supply side through elevators.  Demand could influence how aggressive elevators are in setting 
risk premiums, how consistent elevators are in offering forward bids, and the volatility of 
forward bids, among other things.  Demand for forward contracts could be influenced by the 
other risk management options that producers can use, such as crop insurance, government 
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Appendix A - OLS and RE GLS Coefficient Estimates Without 
Elevator Characteristics 
 
Table A-1, OLS Estimated Coefficients Without Elevator Characteristics 
prem_fc Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
ave_iv 0.0053618 0.0007078 7.85 0.000 0.0039737 0.0067499 
std_fcb1 2.438744 0.0750858 32.48 0.000 2.291494 2.585994 
return1 -0.4401758 0.0224633 -19.6 0.000 -0.4842284 -0.3961232 
week 0.0128371 0.0043058 2.98 0.003 0.004393 0.0212812 
week_sq -0.0004 0.000147 -2.72 0.007 -0.0006882 -0.0001118 
_cons -0.1585976 0.0335707 -4.72 0.000 -0.2244329 0.0927623 




Table A-2, RE GLS Estimated Coefficients Without Elevator Characteristics 
prem_fc        Coef.    Std. Err. z     P>z      [95% Conf. Interval] 
ave_iv    0.0053618 0.0007078 7.85 0.000 0.0039745 0.0067491 
std_fcb1     2.438744 0.0750858 32.48 0.000 2.291579 2.58591 
return1   -0.4401758 0.0224633 -19.6 0.000 -0.4842031 -0.3961485 
week   0.0128371 0.0043058 2.98 0.003 0.0043979 0.0212763 
week_sq   -0.0004 0.000147 -2.72 0.006 -0.0006880 -0.0001119 
_cons     -0.1585976 0.0335707 -4.72 0.000 -0.2243950 -0.0928001 
R-squared 0.4385           
 
